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PARENS PATRIAE RUN AMUCK: THE CHILD
WELFARE SYSTEM'S DISREGARD FOR THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF NONOFFENDING
PARENTS
Vivek S. Sankaran*
Over the past hundred years, a consensus has emerged recognizing a parent's
ability to raise his or her child as a fundamental, sacrosanctright protected by the
Constitution. Federal courts have repeatedly rejected the parens patriae summary
mode of decision making that predominated juvenile courts at the turn of the
twentieth century and have instead held that juvenile courts must afford basic due
process to parentspriorto depriving them of custodial rights to their children. This
recognition has led to the strengthening of procedural protections for parents
accused of child abuse or neglect in civil childprotectionproceedings.
Yet, despite these advances, juvenile courts continue to disregard the
constitutional rights of nonoffending parents, individuals against whom the state
has made no allegations. Nearly every state permits juvenile courts to deprive
nonoffending parents of rights to their children based solely on findings or
admissions of child maltreatment by the other parent.Such actions not only raise
many constitutionalquestions, but also jeopardize children's safety and well-being
by increasingthe likelihood that they will unnecessarily enter foster care and that
their parents will disengage with the process. This Article proposes a policy
solution that reflects the correct balance between safeguarding the constitutional
rights of the nonoffending parent and preserving the flexibility of juvenile court
judges to issue orders ensuring that the child'sneeds are met.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................

56

II.

PARENS PA TRIAE DECISION MAKING .........................................................

59

III.

EMERGENCE

OF

CONSTITUTIONALLY

PROTECTED

PARENTAL

RIGH T S.............................................................................................................

64

Recognition of Substantive Due Process Right to Parent................ 65
ConstitutionalRights of NoncustodialParents................................. 66
EnhancedProceduralProtectionsin Child Welfare Cases .............. 68
THE TREATMENT OF NONOFFENDING PARENTS .......................................
70
70
A . No ParentalPresumption.....................................................................
73
Presumption
...........................
B. Limited Parental
A.
B.
C.

IV.

* Special thanks to Martin Guggenheim, Don Duquette, and Amy Sankaran for reviewing drafts of

this Article and providing insightful feedback. I would also like to thank Ashley Thompson for her
thorough research on this issue.

55

HeinOnline -- 82 Temp. L. Rev. 55 2009-2010

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

56
C

No State Involvement

V.

SHORTCOMINGS OF CURRENT APPROACHES..............................................

76
77

V I.

SO LUTION .......................................................................................................

84

V II.

C ONCLU SION ...................................................................................................

87

I.

.......................

[Vol. 82
..........

INTRODUCTION

Over the past forty years, significant progress has been made in affording
procedural protections to parents accused of child abuse or neglect in civil child
protection proceedings. Before a court can take the authority to make decisions
from a parent who allegedly maltreated her child,' she 2 is entitled to a trial to
adjudicate the allegations against her,3 and in most jurisdictions, is appointed an
attorney to represent her if she is indigent.4 Her attorney is given time to prepare
for the hearing and can use traditional litigation tools including discovery and
subpoena power to gather relevant information. If the state is seeking to
terminate a parent's legal rights to the child, it must prove its case by clear and
convincing evidence.5 Many, if not all, of these changes were precipitated by
landmark Supreme Court decisions recognizing that child protection cases
impose a "'unique kind of deprivation"' on families that necessitate enhanced
due process safeguards not typically available to litigants in civil cases. 6 Though
1. Throughout this Article, the terms "jurisdiction" and "dependency" will be used
interchangeably to describe the act of the court transferring the custodial rights to the child from the
parent to the state.
2. Since the majority of child welfare cases are brought against the child's mother, the offending
parent will often be referred to as "she" and the nonoffending parent as "he." This is done for stylistic
purposes only and in no way is meant to indicate any general belief about the proclivity of either
gender to maltreat children.
3. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972) ("[A]s a matter of due process of law, Stanley was
entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were taken away from him . . . .").
These protections are set forth in state law. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2316 (LexisNexis 2008); MICH.
R. CT., STATE 3.972.
4. See Astra Outley, Representation for Children and Parents in Dependency Proceedings 7 (The
Pew Commission on Children in Foster Care, Background Paper 2003), available at
http://pewfostercare.org/research/docs/Representation.pdf (finding that thirty-nine states have statutes
that provide for appointment of counsel for indigent parents in dependency cases). For examples of
state statutes providing the right to counsel, see ALA. CODE § 12-15-63 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp.
2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-202 (2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-6 (2008).
5. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769-70 (1982) (holding that "clear and convincing"
standard satisfies due process requirements in parental rights termination cases, though states can
impose higher evidentiary burden).
6. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 127-28 (1996) (quoting Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S.
18, 27 (1981)). In Santosky, the Supreme Court observed that
[elven when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the
irretrievable destruction of their family life. If anything, persons faced with forced
dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than
do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs. When the State moves to
destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair
procedures.
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far from perfect, much progress has been made during this time to protect the
civil liberties of the alleged offending parent.7
Yet, despite these advances, child welfare systems continue to disregard the
constitutional rights of nonoffending parents, individuals against whom the state
has made no allegations and who thus have done nothing wrong other than to
have a child in common with a parent who allegedly abused or neglected the
child. These parents are presumed to be unfit based simply on their association
with the other parent. Nearly every state permits juvenile courts to deprive
nonoffending parents of custodial rights to their children based solely on findings
or admissions of child maltreatment by the other parent.8 Courts are empowered
to do this even if the nonoffending parent is ready and willing to assume full
responsibility for the child immediately. In a number of these states, courts even
have the power to place the child in foster care, without any evidence indicating
that the nonoffending parent is unfit, based solely on their subjective
determination that such a placement would further the child's best interests.9 In
others, although the nonoffending parent is allowed to assume physical custody
of the child, the legal authority to make decisions concerning the child rests in
the hands of the juvenile court judge, who also has the power to compel the
nonoffending parent to comply with services, such as attending a parenting
class.10 Only in a few states do nonoffending parents retain their full custodial
rights until evidence of unfitness is introduced." The justification for this nearuniversal approach is clear: "[D]ependency law is based on the protection of the
children rather than the punishment of the parent. It follows that a finding

455 U.S. at 753-54.
7. Though much progress had been made in the past hundred years, procedural protections for
offending parents still remain inadequate. Far too many children are removed from their homes each
year, attorneys appointed to represent parents in child protective cases are often overworked and
poorly compensated, and judges frequently fail to act as neutral decision makers there to safeguard the
constitutional rights of families. See, e.g., Paul Chill, Burden of Proof Begone: The PerniciousEffect of
Emergency Removal in Child Protective Proceedings,41 FAM. Cr. REV. 457, 457-59 (2003) (discussing
statistics regarding high number of emergency child removal proceedings resulting in unnecessary
removals, and difficulties faced by parents in trying to get their child back); Peggy Cooper Davis &
Gautam Barua, Custodial Choices for Children at Risk: Bias, Sequentiality, and the Law, 2 U. CHI. L.
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 139, 147-52 (1995) (addressing sources of bias in child custody proceedings);
Kathleen A. Bailie, Note, The Other "Neglected" Parties in Child Protective Proceedings:Parents in
Poverty and the Role of the Lawyers Who Represent Them, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 2285, 2310-13 (1998)
(describing lack of adequate counsel for parents and resulting effects on indigent parents); Editorial,
Giving Overmatched Parents a Chance, N.Y. TIMEs, June 17, 1996, at A14 (identifying difficulties
facing counsel appointed to parents in neglect hearings).
8. See Angela Greene, The Crab Fisherman and His Children: A Constitutional Compass for the
Non-Offending Parent in Child Protection Cases, 24 ALASKA L. REV. 173, 189 (2007) (noting that only
three states-New York, Maryland, and Pennsylvania-have "found that a child cannot be deemed
dependent or neglected if a fit parent is available to care for that child").
9. See infra Part II for a description of various state approaches to adjudicating the rights of
nonoffending parents. For an outline of various approaches, see Greene, supra note 8, at 181-99.
10. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 8, at 184-86 (describing Michigan's approach to custody
proceedings).
11. Id. at 189-90.
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against one parent is a finding against both in terms of the child being adjudged a
dependent."12
Yet this reasoning, which consistently appears in cases across the country in
which the rights of nonoffending parents have been raised, contravenes Supreme
Court case law holding that parents with established relationships with their
children have a right to direct the upbringing of their child protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment,13 a right which cannot be interfered with absent proof
of parental unfitness.14 This precedent, however, has not influenced the
jurisprudence surrounding nonoffending parents. Juvenile courts throughout the
country continue to disregard the rights of nonoffending parents and maintain
systems in which judges routinely substitute their judgment of what a child needs
for what the child's presumptively fit parent believes is best for the child.
Despite the importance of this issue, it has only received minimal attention
from academics and policymakers. No one has proposed a comprehensive law
and policy solution which balances the rights of the nonoffending parent, the
child, and the parent found to be abusive or neglectful. 5 This Article describes
12. In re Ryan W., No. A115424, 2007 WL 2588808, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2007); see also
L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. John D. (In re James C.), 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 270,
278-79 (Ct. App. 2002) (noting jurisdiction over child may be granted based on actions of one parent
alone); In re Alysha S., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 393, 396-97 (Ct. App. 1996) (rejecting father's claim that
jurisdictional finding against one parent was not valid against the other).
13. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (recognizing, for first time, an individual
constitutional right to "establish a home and bring up children"); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65
(2000) (describing right as "perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests"); Parham v. J.R.,
442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of
the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children. Our cases have consistently
followed that course."); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) ("We have recognized on
numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected.");
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) ("The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a
strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role
of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring
American tradition."); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 534 (1953) ("[A] mother's right to custody of
her children is a personal right entitled to at least as much protection as her right to alimony.").
14. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972).
15. For example, in a recent article addressing this practice in Alaska, one author concluded that
juvenile courts should have no authority to issue any orders regarding the child if a nonoffending
parent seeks to care for his or her child, except to grant that parent long-term custody of the child
immediately. Greene, supra note 8, at 199-201. But, as will be discussed more fully below, this solution
would pose safety risks for the child, would deny the child the ability to receive much-needed services,
and would deprive the offending parent of the opportunity to receive services to rectify the conditions
that led to the maltreatment and perhaps regain custody of her child. Another scholar takes the
opposite approach and proposes that the correct solution is to afford juvenile court judges vast
discretion in determining the child's custody, even if a nonoffending parent is present and has not been
judged to be unfit. Leslie Joan Harris, Involving Nonresident Fathers in Dependency Cases: New
Efforts, New Problems, New Solutions, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 281, 307 (2007). Professor Harris would
permit the court to infringe upon the nonoffending parent's right to legal and physical custody if the
judge feels that such action is in the "best interests of the child." Id. She writes, "A critical part of the
solution to these problems is well-drafted statutes and rules that require judges to ensure children's
safety and give them discretion to make dispositional orders that will serve the child's best interests."
Id. This result, however, yields too much power to the court, which should not have the authority to
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the historical origins of this practice and its conflict with current constitutional
doctrine, and suggests a balanced policy response.
This Article will argue that the child welfare system's disregard for the
rights of nonoffending parents, a vestige of antiquated procedures previously
prevalent in child protective cases, violates the constitutional guarantees in the
Fourteenth Amendment. The practice also affirmatively harms children by
encouraging courts to make decisions based on unreliable information, by
holding children in foster care unnecessarily, and by disempowering fit parents.
Part II will briefly discuss the parens patriaemindset, prevalent during the time
that specialized juvenile courts emerged, that laid the foundation for the current
practice of disregarding the nonoffending parent's rights. This mindset, which
transformed the state into the guardian of all children, permitted the summary
transfer of custodial rights from parents to the state based on general assertions
regarding the child's condition, as opposed to specific findings of each parent's
unfitness. Part III will detail the Supreme Court's rejection of this approach and
the Court's recognition of constitutionally protected parental rights. It will be
argued that these rights extend to nonoffending parents and preclude states from
restricting that parent's legal and physical custodial rights absent evidence of
parental unfitness. Part IV will assert that, in contravention of these holdings,
states have continued to deprive nonoffending parents of custodial rights to their
children without any evidence of parental unfitness. Finally, Part V will argue
that a system that preserves all custodial rights with the fit, nonoffending parent,
while giving courts the flexibility to address the needs of the offending parent
and the child, best serves the interests of children.
II.

PARENS PA TRIAE DECISION MAKING

The foundation for the current practice of depriving nonoffending parents
of legal and physical custodial rights to their children was established at the turn
of the twentieth century, when the parens patriae mindset emerged as the
dominant rationale behind state intervention to protect children.16 Prior to this
time period, parental rights were afforded much deference, frequently to the
detriment of children, and the legal authority for state intervention was
extremely limited. Parents had near-absolute power over their children, and,
often, child abuse and neglect were ignored by the state. As described by one
scholar, "[t]he family's autonomy to do essentially as it saw fit with its children
was untouched."1 7

issue any orders that infringe upon the nonoffending parent's custodial rights. A more nuanced
approach is needed to guide policymakers confronting this complex issue.
16. Parenspatriae,Latin for "ultimate parent or parent of the country," refers to the power of the
state to usurp the legal rights of the natural parent, and to serve as the parent of any child who is in
need of protection. Marvin Ventrell, The History of Child Welfare Law, in CHILD WELFARE LAW AND
PRACTICE: REPRESENTING CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND STATE AGENCIES IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND

DEPENDENCY CASES 113, 126-27 (Marvin Ventrell & Donald N. Duquette eds., 2005).

17. Id. at 117.
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That view, shielding families from government scrutiny, quickly changed as
reformers embraced a more intrusive attitude towards protecting children from
the corrupting influences of their parents and society. Driven by the doctrine of
preventive penology, child advocates-primarily middle and upper class white
women-believed that "society should identify the conditions of childhood
which lead to crime," such as poverty and child abuse and neglect, and should
enact legislation to commit children found in these conditions for their
protection.' 8 This goal necessitated a significant broadening of the state's
authority to intervene in what were previously regarded as private family
matters.
The enhanced scope of state authority was justified by a theory that the
state was acting pursuant to its parens patriae powers, literally translated as
"ultimate parent or parent of the country."' 9 In this role, the state recast itself as
the ultimate guardian of all children with the mandate to determine which
children needed to be protected and how best to accomplish that goal.20 The
state's authority superseded the rights of any individual to the child, including his
or her parents, 21 and all state intervention was characterized as taken to protect

18. Mason P. Thomas, Jr., Child Abuse and Neglect Part 1: HistoricalOverview, Legal Matrix and
Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. REV. 293, 324, 326 (1972). Thomas writes that the new juvenile court
movement did "little more than confirm and extend the nineteenth-century philosophy of preventive
penology" that justified state intervention in the family using informal procedures. Id. at 323. States
gave themselves "broadly defined jurisdiction over neglected children, with little thought . . . given to
the rights of parents and children." Id.
19. Ventrell, supra note 16, at 126. The doctrine was based on English law that provided the
crown with "supreme guardianship" over all children. HERBERT H. Lou, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE

UNITED STATES 3 (Arno Press 1972) (1927). Lord Jekyll explained the doctrine in Eyre v. Shaftsbury,
the leading English case decided in 1772:
The care of all infants is lodged in the king as parens patriae, and by the king this care is
delegated to his Court of Chancery. . . .Idiots and lunatics, who are incapable to take care of
themselves, are provided for by the king as parens patriae; and there is some reason to
extend this care to infants.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Eyre v. Shaftsbury, (1722) 24 Eng. Rep. 659, 664 (Ch.)). This
reasoning appears in early appellate decisions involving juvenile court decisions. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 62 A. 198, 200 (Pa. 1905) (describing Juvenile Court Act as "an exercise by
the state of its supreme power over the welfare of its children . .. under which it can take a child from
its father and let it go where it will . . . if the welfare of the child . . . can be thus best promoted").

Under this doctrine, the state not only had the right but the obligation to establish standards for the
child's care. Mary Virginia Dobson, The Juvenile Court and Parental Rights, 4 FAM. L.Q. 393, 396
(1970).
20. See Lou, supra note 19, at 5 ("It has been generally maintained that the juvenile court is but
an embodiment in the law and in a specific institution of an ancient doctrine and of modem methods
in the exercise of the power of the state as the ultimate parent of the child.").
21. See id. at 9 ("The tendency of American courts has been to repudiate the notion that there
can be such a thing as a proprietary right to or interest in the custody of an infant."); WILLIAM H.
SHERIDAN, CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, STANDARDS FOR

JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTS 3 (1966) (observing that "some early writers ...

tended to consider

parental rights as merely a privilege or duty conferred upon the parent in the exercise of the police
power of the State").
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the child, not to punish the parent. 22 Armed with this new conception of the
state's role, reformers pushed for the creation of specialized juvenile courts, the
first of which appeared in Illinois in 1899.23 Immediately thereafter, other states
followed. By 1904, ten states had established such courts. 24 By 1920, all but three
had. 25 The public broadly accepted the emergence of these courts, and a
consensus emerged supporting the state's newfound role as the protector of all
children.
In the newly created specialized courts, juvenile court judges became the
state's designee to exercise its parens patriae authority, and procedures were
implemented to expedite the transfer of custody from parents to the state.
Broad, subjective legal standards were adopted, allowing the judge vast amounts
of discretion to determine in which cases to intervene. 26 For example, one
common statute permitted the court to assume custody of a child if the child was
"without proper parental care or guardianship," while another ground rested on
whether the child lived "in surroundings dangerous to morals, health, or general
welfare." 27 Courts often relied upon very general findings to base their decisions
on whether a child was neglected. 28 Not surprisingly, a study of the first juvenile
court in Chicago found that "only 6.0% of the 10,631 petitions filed were
dismissed, while in 88.5% of the cases a finding of neglect was made." 29 As aptly
summarized by a prominent scholar during that era, "In the case of the juvenile
court, except in general terms, there is very little substantive law. To do
something constructive for the child is the goal of the entire procedure." 30
Minimal procedural protections for parents complimented the broad legal
standards for intervention. 31 Hearings were kept informal32 and summary, 33 the
22. Lou, supra note 19, at 10 ("The most fundamental principle of the juvenile court-that
juvenile-court acts are not criminal in their nature, because their purpose is not to punish but to save
the child-has been almost universally affirmed by courts of last resort.").
23. Ventrell, supra note 16, at 132-33.
24. Lou, supra note 19, at 24.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 68 (noting that statutes give juvenile courts "broad jurisdiction and large
discretionary powers"); ANTHONY M. PLATr, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY

135 (1969) (arguing that "such high standards of family propriety [were set] that almost any parent
could be accused of not fulfilling his 'proper function').
27. Lou, supra note 19, at 54.
28. See Comment, The Custody Question and Child Neglect Rehearings,35 U. CHI. L. REV. 478,
479 (1968) ("[Tihe courts often rely on 'general grounds' rather than any precise finding when they
find children neglected.").
29. Note, Child Neglect: Due Processfor the Parent,70 COLuM. L. REV. 465, 466 (1970).
30. Lou, supra note 19, at 99.
31. Ventrell describes the parens patriae mindset as one in which courts were entitled to take
custody of a child, regardless of the status of the child as a victim or offender, "without due process of
law, because of the state's authority and obligation to save children from becoming criminal[s]."
Ventrell, supra note 16, at 126. One early court rationalized, "To save a child from becoming a
criminal ... the Legislature surely may provide for the salvation of such a child ... by bringing it into
one of the courts of the state without any process at all." Commonwealth v. Fisher, 62 A. 198, 200 (Pa.
1905).
32. See BERNARD FLEXNER & REUBEN OPPENHEIMER, CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF
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rules of evidence were relaxed, 34 and the appearance of lawyers was strongly
discouraged.3 5 Since all parties were purportedly working towards a common
goal-the best interests of the child-the proponents of this system rationalized
that adversarial procedures were not only unnecessary but were
counterproductive. 36 Often, decisions on the future custody of a child were
determined summarily at the first court hearing, without giving the parents an
opportunity to prepare or to seek counsel. 37 In these juvenile courts, neither the
law nor strict procedural formalities were permitted to prevent the judge from
making a decision which he deemed best for an individual child.38 "[T]hat the
hearing has been legally conducted and no law violated is no excuse if the child is
finally lost." 39

LABOR, PUB. No. 99, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF THE JUVENILE COURT 8-9 (1922) ("The procedure of

the court must be as informal as possible. Its purpose is not to punish but to save."); SUSAN TIFFIN, IN
WHOSE BEST INTEREST? CHILD WELFARE REFORM IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 223 (1982) (stating

that staff in juvenile proceedings tried to make these proceedings as informal as possible). According
to Tiffin, "[n]ormally the judge accepted the recommendation of the probation officer, since there was
little time to devote to each case." TIFFIN, supra, at 224.
33. The concept of summary, prompt procedures was key to the efficient juvenile court. For
example, "[tihe original Illinois [Juvenile Court] Act provided that 'the court shall proceed to hear and
dispose of the case in a summary manner."' MONRAD G. PAULSEN & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD,

JUVENILE LAW AND PROCEDURE 2 (1974) (quoting Ill. Laws 1899, 131-37 § 5).
34. See Lou, supra note 19, at 139 (suggesting that, especially in cases of dependency and neglect,
juvenile courts should not refuse protection to child based on lack of "technical legal evidence").
35. Id. at 138 ("The better juvenile courts have been successful in discouraging the appearance of
attorneys in most cases."); SHERIDAN, supra note 21, at 56 (observing that "in some courts counsel
were not welcome - an attitude which was carried to the point of attempted exclusion"); Walter H.
Beckham, Helpful Practices in Juvenile Court Hearings, FED. PROBATION, June 1949, at 10, 13 ("In
most juvenile proceedings, lawyers are not required and the majority of cases are heard without
them."). Even as late as 1970, only a few states had extended a statutory right to counsel in abuse and
neglect cases. Note, supranote 29, at 475.
36. See Monrad G. Paulsen, Juvenile Courts, Family Courts, and the Poor Man, 54 CAL. L. REV.
694, 703 (1966) (writing that "[i]n juvenile court there were to be no adversaries, only friends of the
child united in their desire to help him"). Many justified the procedural informality of this system by
characterizing it as not criminal in nature, but there to further the interests of the child. Thus,
constitutional rights were not implicated and strict processes did not need to be followed. See LOU,
supra note 19, at 10 ("If they are not of a criminal nature, they are not unconstitutional because of
their non-conformance to certain constitutional guarantees."); Wright S. Walling & Stacia Walling
Driver, 100 Years of Juvenile Court in Minnesota - A Historical Overview and Perspective,32 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 883, 893-94 (2006) ("The power of the juvenile court to operate in this informal
fashion was almost universally sustained in state courts by characterizing the proceedings as civil
rather than criminal - an exercise of parens patriae power.").
37. ALFRED J. KAHN, A COURT FOR CHILDREN: A STUDY OF THE NEW YORK CITY CHILDREN'S

COURT 100-01 (1953). Kahn describes one case in which the "judge so convinced himself' that the
father was a gambler that he "became so angry that he sent the man out of the courtroom and did all
the planning with the wife." Id. at 112.
38. See Lou, supra note 19, at 129 ("In order to secure the utmost possible simplicity, it has been
found necessary in the hearing of children's cases to disregard the technicalities of procedure which
are not absolutely necessary and which tend to confuse a child's mind.").
39. Id. at 129-30 (quoting Charles W. Hoffman, Saving the Child, 45 SURV. 704,704-05 (1921)).
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With a broad mandate to intervene and relaxed procedures that ensured
that he would not be encumbered with needless formalities, in each case, the
juvenile court judge quickly assumed the role of the child's parent. Rather than
focus on whether each of the child's parents was unfit or which of the two
maltreated her, the judge simply sought to determine whether the general
condition of the child warranted a need for the court to intervene. 40 So long as
the child was maltreated in some way by someone, the court could apply its
dispositional powers to order the remedy that it deemed was in the child's best
interest. In other words, if one parent committed an offense against the child, the
court could obtain custodial authority over the child regardless of the fitness of
the other parent.41 Again, since each parent's rights were deemed subservient to
the court's parenspatriaeauthority, the court's sole concern was the condition of
the child, not the responsibility of the individual parent for the abuse or
neglect. 42
A number of published cases in this period demonstrate these principles in
practice. Take, for example, the case of Bleier v. Crouse 43 an Ohio case decided
in 1920 in which three children were committed to a children's home despite the
trial court's failure to provide notice of the proceedings to the children's father.44
On appeal, the county court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision finding
that the father misconstrued the nature of juvenile court proceedings. 45 The
court found that "[t]here [was] no authority to support the contention that notice
to the parent [was] a condition prerequisite to jurisdiction of the juvenile court
over the child." 46 The court held that "[a]n examination of the juvenile law as a
whole leads us to the conclusion that the jurisdiction of the court attaches to the
child without regard to the citation of the parent." 47 Although the court
acknowledged the father's right to challenge the placement of the children at a
later time, "[i]n the interest of the child and in the interest of society the court
can commit its custody to strangers, or to an institution for its moral training and
education" 48 without notifying the child's parents. Any rights held by each
parent to the child were subordinate to the court's parenspatriaeauthority. 49

40. See id. at 54 (explaining that dependency and neglect are broadly defined to cover any child
needing state's protection).
41. See id. at 8 ("Whether the rights of the parents are superior to those of the state or whether
the state occupies the position of primary parent, it has been well conceded that the welfare of the
child is the paramount consideration, and, in the matter of custody, this principle governs court
decisions.").
42. Id. at 8-9.
43. 13 Ohio App. 69 (Ct. App. 1920).
44. Bleier, 13 Ohio App. at 70, 74.
45. Id. at 76-77.
46. Id. at 74-75.
47. Id. at 75.
48. Id.
49. Bleier, 13 Ohio App. at 74-75.
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Similarly, in Allen v. Williams,50 the Supreme Court of Idaho upheld a trial
court's decision to remove a child from her mother's custody despite failing to
serve a petition on her, give her any notice, or provide her with an opportunity to
be heard.51 The Idaho Supreme Court dismissed the mother's argument that
procedural due process required that her constitutional rights be determined
prior to the juvenile court assuming temporary custody over her child. 52 Instead,
the court reasoned:
Our statute was enacted as a matter of protection to the child and for
the welfare of the state. The Legislature, in enacting this law, no doubt
saw the wisdom of prompt commitment of a child, who is upon the
high road to becoming a moral degenerate and perhaps a future charge
upon and a disgrace to the state. To drag such a case through a lengthy
and formal criminal or civil proceeding, without prompt detention and
commitment of the child, would in many cases thwart the object of the
law. 53
These two cases typify the approach embodied by the original juvenile
courts. 54 In this system, the state's paternalism trumped all other interests. The
state, acting upon the assumption that its powers superseded all authority
conferred by birth on natural parents, granted itself the immediate right to
determine the child's best interests without deference to the parent's wishes.
Appeals by parents based on the core concepts underlying due process-notice
and a meaningful opportunity to be heard-were largely rejected, which signified
that the parent's role in the decision-making process was, at best, marginal.55
Assertions of a parental right to custody based on fitness were ignored and
instead yielded to the state's subjective determination of what was best for "its"
child. The summary transfer of decision-making authority from parents to
juvenile court judges in order to "save" children represented the core of the
parenspatriaeapproach to child welfare.
III. EMERGENCE OF CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED PARENTAL RIGHTS

At nearly the same time as the emergence of specialized juvenile courts, the
United States Supreme Court began recognizing a substantive due process right
50. 171 P. 493 (Idaho 1918).
51. See Allen, 171 P. at 493 (setting forth mother's allegations).
52. Id. at 494.
53. Id.
54. Other cases during this period reflected the fundamental belief that the transfer of child
custody from a parent to the court could occur in a summary manner without much regard to due
process. See, e.g., Farnham v. Pierce, 6 N.E. 830, 831-32 (Mass. 1886) (stating that "proceeding is
intended to be summary" and that no notice needs to be given and no complaint is required prior to
committing child); State ex rel. Jones v. West, 201 S.W. 743, 744 (Tenn. 1918) ("The State, thus acting
upon the assumption that its parentage supersedes all authority conferred by birth on the natural
parents, takes upon itself the power and right to dispose of the custody of children, as it shall judge
best for their welfare.").
55. See, e.g., Farnham, 6 N.E. at 832 (explaining that notice and trial are unnecessary in child
commitment proceedings); Jones, 201 S.W. at 744 (recognizing that state has ultimate power to serve
child's best interests).
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to parent protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The recognition and
expansion of this right, which encompasses decisions by both custodial and
noncustodial parents, ultimately led to enhanced procedural protections for
offending parents in child welfare cases. This section will briefly outline the
development of this right and how it led to the rejection of the parens patriae
model of decision making. In the next section, it will be argued that the
treatment of nonoffending parents is a lingering remnant of the parens patriae
mindset.
A.

Recognition of Substantive Due ProcessRight to Parent

The Court first recognized the existence of a substantive due process right
to direct the upbringing of one's child in Meyer v. Nebraska,56 a case appealing
the conviction of a schoolteacher who taught German to young children.57 The
Court, in ruling that the conviction should be overturned, had the opportunity to
consider what rights were encompassed by the word "liberty" in the Fourteenth
Amendment, which it determined, "[w]ithout doubt," to include the right of the
individual to "establish a home and bring up children."ss Two years later, the
Court, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,59 again found a substantive due process right
for parents "to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control."60 The Court famously declared that "[t]he child is not the mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations." 61 In Prince v. Massachusetts,62 the Court reaffirmed the vitality of
this parental right in the context of a Jehovah's Witness appealing a conviction
for violating state child labor laws. 63 Though the Court affirmed the conviction, it
elevated the stature of the parental right, describing it as a "sacred private
interest[], basic in a democracy."64 In the years after Meyer, Pierce, and Prince,
the parental right has been used to insulate an array of parental decisions from
65
state intervention in areas such as directing a child's religious upbringing,
66
choosing with whom the child should associate, and making medical decisions

56. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
57. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396-97.
58. Id. at 399.
59. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
60. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
61. Id. at 535.
62. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
63. Prince, 321 U.S. at 159, 165.
64. Id. at 165.
65. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207, 234-36 (1972) (finding that First and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibited state from making Amish children attend school until age sixteen when doing
so violated parents' decisions about children's religious upbringing).
66. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60-63, 67 (2000) (holding unconstitutional state
statute that permitted judge to allow grandparent visitation against parent's consent solely on
determination that visits were in child's best interests).
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on behalf of the child.67 The conception of the state as the primary protector,
guardian, and decision maker for the child, as theorized in Plato's Republic, has
been soundly rejected.68
B.

ConstitutionalRights of Noncustodial Parents

The changing dynamic of the family structure, primarily the increasing
prevalence of children being raised by unmarried and separated parents, forced
the Court to confront the question of who-or what type of parent-is entitled
to protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Prior to the 1970s, unwed
fathers held no legal rights to their children and states commonly usurped
parental decision making upon the death of the child's mother if she was
unmarried.69 The unwed father had no presumptive legal right to make decisions
and care for the child. 70 All of this changed in the landmark case of Stanley v.
Illinois.7 1
In Stanley, the Court evaluated an Illinois law under which the state
automatically placed children of unwed fathers in foster care upon their mother's
death. 72 The record revealed that Mr. Stanley had intermittently cared for his
children throughout their lives, and upon their mother's death had located
friends to care for the children.7 3 The State, emphasizing its parens patriae
authority, argued that it assumed full responsibility for the child immediately
upon the death of the unmarried mother since unwed fathers were presumed to
be unsuitable parents. 74 It sought to shift the burden of proving parental fitness
onto the noncustodial father, whom it said could establish his ability to care for
the child by filing for guardianship or adoption, options any legal stranger to the
child could pursue. 75
The Court rejected the state's argument and held that the Constitution
requires, as a matter of due process, that the father have a "hearing on his fitness

67. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R, 442 U.S. 584, 620-21 (1979) (finding formal due process procedures
were not constitutionally required when parents were seeking to commit their children to mental
health institutions).
68. In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court described Plato's conception of the Ideal Commonwealth:
"That the wives of our guardians are to be common, and their children are to be common, and no
parent is to know his own child, nor any child his parent." 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1925). The Court
soundly rejected that idea. It stated, "Although such measures have been deliberately approved by
men of great genius their ideas touching the relation between individual and State were wholly
different from those upon which our institutions rest." Id. at 402; see also Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 535 (1925) ("The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union
repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children.").
69. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646-47 (1972) (nothing that under state law children became
wards of state upon death of unwed mother regardless of father's fitness as parent).
70. See id. at 647 (noting that state law presumed unwed fathers to be unfit).
71. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
72. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646.
73. Id.; Brief for the Petitioner at *4, Stanley, 405 U.S. 645 (No. 70-5014).
74. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 647-50.
75. Id. at 648-49.
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as a parent before his children were taken from him."76 The State's interest in
efficiency did not permit it to presume all unmarried fathers to be unfit:
Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than
individualized determination. But when, as here, the procedure
forecloses the determinative issues of competence and care, when it
explicitly disdains present realities in deference to past formalities, it
needlessly risks running roughshod over the important interests of both
parent and child. It therefore cannot stand."
In other words, the Court made clear that depriving both custodial and
noncustodial parents of rights to their child without a judicial determination of
their unfitness violated the Constitution. 78
Decisions after Stanley elaborated on the level of involvement noncustodial
parents had to establish in their child's life in order to grasp the bundle of rights
the Constitution afforded to parents. A common principle emerged from these
cases. "When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood by 'com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing
of his child,' his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial
protection under the due process clause." 79 Thus, in Lehr v. Robertson,80 the
Court upheld a New York statute that did not require that a father be notified of
his child's impending adoption because the father had failed to take meaningful
steps towards establishing a parental relationship with his child. 8' The Court
reasoned:
The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the
natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a
relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and
accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future, he may
enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely
valuable contributions to the child's development. If he fails to do so,
the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a state to listen
to his opinion of where the child's best interests lie.82
Similarly, in Quilloin v. Walcott,83 the Court held that a biological parent,
who had minimal contact with the child, could not disrupt a child's adoption into
a family with whom the child had already been living.84 In both decisions, the
Court prevented parents who had not made efforts to establish a relationship
with their child from using the Constitution as a sword to disrupt the child's
permanent placement.

76. Id. at 649.
77. Id. at 656-57.
78. See id. at 651 (noting parent's rights to raise children should only be limited by strong
countervailing forces).
79. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (citation omitted).
80. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
81. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 264, 266-68.
82. Id. at 262.
83. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
84. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255.
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Where, however, the parent established such a relationship, the Court has
prevented states from infringing upon that intact parent-child bond without
providing adequate process. In Caban v. Mohammed,85 the Court struck down a
New York statute that denied a father the right to object to an adoption that the
biological mother had already consented to.86 Although the decision was based
on equal protection grounds, the Court's holding centered on the fact that the
father was as involved in the children's upbringing as their mother.87 Although
the Court has never prescribed the specific actions a noncustodial parent must
take to grasp his constitutionally protected interest in his child, the Court's
rulings clarify that the physical and legal custodial rights of parents who have
established relationships with their children are constitutionally protected from
state interference absent proof of unfitness.
C.

Enhanced ProceduralProtectionsin Child Welfare Cases

The Supreme Court's recognition of constitutionally protected parental
rights has fueled enhanced procedural protections in child abuse and neglect
cases. In Santosky v. Kramer,88 the Court determined that the state had to prove
parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence prior to terminating parental
rights. 89 In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,90 the Court held that in
some termination proceedings the Constitution mandated the appointment of
counsel for parents.91 In M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,92 the Court concluded that due process
required courts to furnish indigent litigants trial court transcripts, free of cost,
when appealing termination of parental rights decisions. 93 On numerous
occasions, the Court has described the deprivation in child protective cases as a
"unique kind of deprivation," 94 implicated by even a temporary dislocation of a
child from his or her parent's custody. This deprivation warrants heightened
procedural protections not typically applicable in civil proceedings.
State legislatures have responded by affording parents accused of child
abuse or neglect an increased panoply of statutory protections to safeguard their
fundamental rights. Nearly every state appoints attorneys to represent the
alleged offender at the outset of a civil child protective case. 95 The parent is
given an opportunity to contest the emergency removal of the child, if it occurs,
85. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
86. Caban, 441 U.S. at 382.
87. Id. at 389 (noting that "an unwed father may have a relationship with his children fully
comparable to that of the mother").
88. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
89. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 748.
90. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
91. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32 (leaving decision "whether due process calls for the appointment
of counsel for indigent parents in termination proceedings to be answered in the first instance by the
trial court").
92. 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
93. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 127-28.
94. E.g., id. (quoting Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27).
95. See supra note 4 and accompanying text for a discussion of this point.
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and has the chance to prepare for a full-blown evidentiary hearing, typically
several months after the filing of the petition, to contest the allegations made
against her.96 In most jurisdictions, discovery rights are afforded, strict
evidentiary rules apply, and appellate rights exist to remedy incorrect decisions. 97
If the state fails to meet its burden, the case is dismissed. Though many flaws
continue to permeate the child protective system, the court system has been
revolutionized over the past thirty years to safeguard the rights of the alleged
offender, a transformation spurred by the seminal cases noted above,
recognizing and reaffirming the sanctity of a parent's right to raise his or her
child.
The decisions by the Supreme Court, along with the increased procedural
protections in state statutes, evinced the rejection of the parens patriaemode of
decision making in child protective cases. The prompt, summary transfer of
children from their parents into state custody was repudiated and instead
replaced by a process consistent with basic notions of due process-notice, an
opportunity to be heard, and a presumption of fitness that must be rebutted by
the state at a judicial hearing. Any doubt regarding the rejection of the parens
patriae model was resolved in In re Gault,98 a juvenile delinquency case in which
the Court held that children accused of crimes were entitled to receive many of
the protections afforded to adult criminal defendants, such as the receipt of
notice, appointment of counsel, and the ability to cross-examine and confront
witnesses.99 In doing so, the Court issued a strong pronouncement against the
informality so prevalent in juvenile court proceedings justified under the parens
patriae rhetoric. The Court described the Latin phrase as "a great help to those
who sought to rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional
scheme"100 but found that "its meaning is murky and its historic credentials are
of dubious relevance."10 1 The conclusion reached by the Court was clear: "'[T]he
admonition to function in a 'parental' relationship is not an invitation to
procedural arbitrariness.'
One studying this line of cases and assessing the resulting changes made in
state child protective laws would likely conclude that the transformation of
juvenile courts has been completed and that a new structure emphasizing
procedural fairness governs decision making. In many ways, particularly with
respect to the treatment of parents accused of maltreatment, this may be true.
Yet, in one important respect-the treatment of nonoffending parents-the
96. See, e.g., MICH. R. CT., STATE 3.965(C) (permitting parent to contest foster care placement of
child); MICH. R. Cr., STATE 3.972 (providing parent with right to trial within sixty-three days of child's
removal from home).
97. See, e.g., MICH. R. Cr., STATE 3.922(A) (providing parents with discovery rights); MICH. R.
Cr., STATE 3.972(C)(1) (applying rules of evidence to neglect trial): MICH. R. Cr., STATE 3.993
(outlining appellate rights for parents).
98. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
99. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41, 57.
100. Id. at 16.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 30 (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966)).
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antiquated mindset of a previous era lingers. In most jurisdictions, the state still
maintains the right to summarily usurp custodial authority from a parent against
whom no allegations of unfitness are made, based solely on the conduct of the
other parent. The remainder of this Article discusses the various manifestations
of this practice and how it harms children, and, in the final Part, proposes a
policy solution that balances the constitutional rights of the nonoffending parent
with the interests of the child and the other parent.
IV.

THE TREATMENT OF NONOFFENDING PARENTS

The overwhelming majority of states currently maintain child welfare
systems that disregard the constitutional rights of nonoffending parents.
Although the manifestations of the deprivation vary, the justification for the
different approaches has been consistent: the state's lingering parens patriae
authority warrants it to take an active role in a child's life where there is
evidence that one parent has maltreated the child even when the other has done
nothing wrong. 103 Appellate decisions scrutinizing these systems have given scant
attention to the constitutional rights of the nonoffending parent and have
generally endorsed the state's ability to encroach on the nonoffending parent's
rights based on its determination that such actions are in the child's best interest.
Those few states that have rejected this encroachment have instead adopted an
extreme approach that prevents juvenile courts from intervening in any way with
respect to either parent or the child where the child has only been maltreated by
one parent. In my estimation, the correct balance would permit the court, upon a
finding that a child has been harmed by one parent, to assume limited
jurisdiction over the case to remedy the effects of the maltreatment by the
offending parent, while forbidding it to restrict the custodial rights of the
nonoffending parent, except in limited circumstances. The strengths of this
balanced approach will be discussed in Part IV.B.
A.

No ParentalPresumption

States have intruded upon the constitutional rights of nonoffending parents
in several ways. A number of states, such as Michigan and Ohio, have adopted
policies which permit courts to strip nonoffending parents of all custodial rights
to their children immediately upon a finding that the other parent has abused or
neglected the child. 10 In these jurisdictions, immediately upon a finding against

103. See infra Part IV.A for a discussion of cases relying on the best interests of the child to
justify actions against nonoffending parents.
104. Numerous cases in Ohio have removed the custody rights of the nonoffending parent. See,
e.g., In re C.R., 843 N.E.2d 1188, 1192 (Ohio 2006) (concluding that court is not required to separately
consider suitability of noncustodial parent before giving custody to nonparent); In re Russel, No. 06CA-12, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 6565, at *5-6 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 27,2006) (same); In re Osberry, No.
1-03-26,2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 4922, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 14,2003) (same). Michigan cases have
been resolved in a manner similar to cases in Ohio. See, e.g., In re Camp, No. 265301, 2006 Mich. App.
LEXIS 1620, at *1-2 (Mich. Ct. App. May 9, 2006) (explaining that there is no requirement to hold
separate hearing before entering order involving placement of child with nonparent); In re Church,
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one parent, the trial court obtains temporary custody of the child and can issue
any order it deems to be in the child's best interest. Even without a finding of
unfitness against the nonoffending parent, the court can place the child in foster
care,105 compel the nonoffending parent to comply with services, 106 and order
that that parent's rights be terminated based on the failure to comply with those
services. 1m These systems treat nonoffending parents as legal strangers to the
child, and the burden is placed on them to prove to the court that it is in the
child's best interest to be placed with them. In these jurisdictions, Supreme
Court precedent has had little impact on shaping the jurisprudence involving
nonoffending parents.
Take, for example, the Michigan case of In re Church,08 which involved
three children over whom the court assumed jurisdiction based solely on a plea
entered by the children's father.109 The father admitted that he had neglected the
children by not financially supporting them and by failing to protect them from
their mother's emotional and mental instability. 110 Although the initial petition
contained allegations against the mother, the prosecutor withdrew the
allegations immediately after the father's plea was accepted. The trial court did
not afford the mother a jury trial on the allegations against her, as she had
requested.' Then, at the dispositional hearing, the court ordered that the three
children be placed outside of the mother's custody, compelled the mother to
comply with services, and determined that it would decide, at a later date,
whether it was in the children's best interests to be returned to her custody. 112 At
no point did the trial court find that the mother was unfit.
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's actions.us3 It
stated that upon a finding against one parent, Michigan law permitted the trial
court to dispense with holding an adjudicative hearing to substantiate the
allegations against the mother and could enter any orders involving her,
including those mandating compliance with services that it deemed were in the
children's interests. 114 It also concluded that Michigan statutes provided vast
No. 263541, 2006 Mich. App. LEXIS 1098, at *4-6 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2006) (same); In re
Stramaglia, No. 256133,2005 Mich. App. LEXIS 1339, at *5-6 (Mich. Ct. App. May 26,2005) (same).
105. See, e.g., In re C.R., 843 N.E.2d at 1192 ("When a juvenile court adjudicates a child to be
abused, neglected or dependent, it has no duty to make a separate finding at the dispositional hearing
that a non-custodial parent is unsuitable before awarding legal custody to a nonparent.").
106. See, e.g., In re B.C., No. 23044, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 3197, at *8-9 (Ohio Ct. App. June
28, 2006) (finding that supervision of placement with birth fathers was appropriate even without proof
of parental unfitness).
107. See, for example, infra notes 108-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of In re Church,
in which the court required the mother to comply with services before it decided whether to terminate
her parental rights regarding her three children.
108. No. 263541, 2006 Mich. App. LEXIS 1098 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2006).
109. In re Church, 2006 Mich. App. LEXIS 1098, at *2.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at *1-2.
114. In re Church, 2006 Mich. App. LEXIS 1098, at *4-5.
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discretion for courts to enter orders "placing the children outside of the custodial
parent's care whose neglect did not factor into the assumption of jurisdiction
over the children"11 5 as long as the court was acting "to ensure the children's
well-being." 116 Countless numbers of cases in Michigan have similarly treated
nonoffending parents as legal strangers to the child.117
The Illinois case of In re YA. 118 applied similar reasoning. In that case, the
trial court obtained jurisdiction over the child after the child's mother admitted
that she had created a harmful living environment.' 19 No findings of
maltreatment were issued against the father, and instead, the trial court explicitly
found the father to be a fit parent. 12 0 Yet, the court still named the Department
of Children and Family Services as the guardian of the child, which then
determined that placement in foster care was warranted.121 The Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's decision, justified the decision by
observing that, "[a~lthough it is true that the [father] was fit, the purpose of the
dispositional hearing was for the trial court to determine whether it was in the
best interests of the child to be made a ward of the court," 122 and thus it could
place the child in foster care even after determining that a parent was fit. In
other words, even without a finding of unfitness, the parent's constitutional right
to custody could be displaced by the court's subjective determination of what
was best for the child.
A third case, In re M.D.,123 demonstrates the prevalence of this approach. A
child entered foster care after her father was arrested.124 The trial court
subsequently found that the child came under its purview based on the father's
conduct, but made no findings against the child's mother. 125 Despite the mother's
request for immediate custody, the court placed the child with her paternal

115. Id. at *7.
116. Id. at *8.
117. See supra note 104 for a sampling of these cases. Decisions in Michigan stripping
nonoffending parents of their custodial rights have relied upon the holding of In re CR., in which the
Michigan Court of Appeals held that "[o]nce the family court acquires jurisdiction over the children,"
the court rule "authorizes the family court to hold a dispositional hearing 'to determine measures to be
taken ... against any adult"' and "then allows the family court 'to order compliance with all or part of
the case service plan and may enter such orders as it considers necessary in the interest of the child."'
646 N.W.2d 506, 515 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (emphasis omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting MICH.
R. Cr., STATE 5.973(A)).
118. 890 N.E.2d 710 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
119. In re Y.A., 890 N.E.2d at 711-12.
120. Id. at 713.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 714.
123. No. CA2006-09-223, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 4181 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2007). Although
the court recognized that both the United States and Ohio Constitutions afford a parent a
fundamental right to the custody of his children, the court held that "'[tihe best interest of the child is
the primary consideration' in such cases." In re M.D., 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 4181, at *6 (quoting In
re Allah, No. C-040239, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 1163, at *10 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 18,2005)).
124. Id. at *3.
125. Id.
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grandparents, determining that it was best for the child to live with them. 126 On
appeal, the Ohio Court of Appeals upheld the court's actions. The court ruled
that a juvenile court "'has no duty to make a separate finding at the dispositional
hearing that a noncustodial parent is unsuitable before awarding legal custody of
a child to a non-parent relative."' 127 Instead, an adjudication of abuse or neglect
"'is a determination about the care and condition of a child and implicitly
involves a determination of the unsuitability of the child's custodial and/or
noncustodial parents."' 1 28 Thus, based on one parent's conduct, the presumption
that the other parent is fit is implicitly extinguished and the burden shifts to that
parent to prove his or her adequacy.
These three cases typify the common practice of completely disregarding
the nonoffending parent's rights in juvenile courts. Treated as a stranger to the
child, the nonoffending parent has no legal rights to the child and instead must
convince the state of his or her suitability, a tough burden of persuasion
especially in a setting in which parents are routinely viewed with suspicion.
These cases only give passing reference to the nonoffending parent's substantive
due process right to raise his child and rarely address the Supreme Court's
Stanley v. Illinoisl29 decision, which seemingly requires juvenile courts to make
findings of unfitness prior to interfering with a parent's custodial rights.130
Despite serious constitutional infirmities, these approaches have survived
numerous challenges on appeal.
B.

Limited ParentalPresumption

A number of other jurisdictions have adopted a more nuanced approach
while continuing to deprive nonoffending parents of their full custodial rights. In
these courts, judges recognize the parental presumption but only apply the
presumption with regards to the physical custody of the child. Absent a finding
of unfitness, nonoffending parents are granted physical custody of their children,
but the court still retains legal custody, that is, the authority to make decisions
regarding the child, and can order the nonoffending parent to comply with
services. 131 Though safeguarding the physical custody rights of nonoffending
parents, these systems intrude on their legal custody.

126. Id. at *1.
127. Id. at *8 (quoting In re C.R., 843 N.E.2d 1188, 1192 (Ohio 2006)).
128. In re M.D., 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 4181, at *8 (quoting In re C.R., 843 N.E.2d at 1192).
129. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
130. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658 (holding that failure to provide unwed father a hearing on
parental fitness qualifications prior to state's assumption of child custody, while affording a hearing to
other parents, denies unwed father equal protection of law).
131. See, e.g., In re S.G., 581 A.2d 771, 781 (D.C. 1990) (observing that "child's best interest is
presumptively served by being with a parent, provided that the parent is not abusive or otherwise
unfit"); In re M.K., 649 N.E.2d 74, 80-82 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (permitting court to take jurisdiction over
child based on conduct of one parent but finding that physical custody of child should be awarded to
fit parent); State v. Terry G. (In re Amber G.), 554 N.W.2d 142, 149 (Neb. 1996) (permitting trial court
to order nonoffending parent to comply with services after finding of neglect but holding that "court
may not properly deprive a biological or adoptive parent of the custody of the minor child unless it is
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Decisions in Florida and California best illustrate this approach.132 In J.P. v.
Department of Children and Families,33 the trial court found that a child was
dependent due to the actions of the mother but determined that evidence of the
father's unfitness was insufficient.134 The court recognized that Florida law
imposed a requirement to transfer physical custody of the child to the
nonoffending parent upon the completion of the home study, but proceeded to
condition that placement on the father submitting to a psychological evaluation
and complying with any recommendations made by the evaluator.135 The father
appealed, arguing that since he was found to be a nonoffending parent, the court
lacked the authority to order him to participate in services.136
The Florida Court of Appeals disagreed. The court interpreted the juvenile
code to permit any parent, regardless of his or her responsibility for the child's
abuse or neglect, to participate in treatment and services as the court determined
was necessary.137 Specifically, even after the restoration of physical custody to
the nonoffending parent, the Florida statute in question permitted the court to
order "that services be provided solely to the parent who is assuming physical
custody in order to allow that parent to retain later custody without court
jurisdiction, or that services be provided to both parents." 38 Few limits exist to
constrain the juvenile court's ability to intrude on the nonoffending parent's
decision-making authority. Despite the lack of an unfitness finding, the law
presumes that the court is in a better position than the nonoffending parent to
make decisions regarding the child's.139
affirmatively shown that such parent is unfit"); In re Bill F., 761 A.2d 470, 476 (N.H. 2000) (finding
that court must give nonoffending parent full hearing at which state must prove unfitness prior to
deprivation of physical custody, but noting that "[n]othing in this opinion should be read to prevent
the State from . . . providing social services for the benefit of a child"); New Mexico ex rel. Children,
Youth & Families Dep't. v. Benjamin 0., 160 P.3d 601, 609-10 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that
reversal of findings against father did not deprive trial court of ability to order him to comply with
court-ordered services but required presumption that custody with father was in child's best interest);
In re Christina I., 640 N.Y.S.2d 310, 310 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (finding that although trial court
dismissed allegations against mother, it still had jurisdiction to enter orders pertaining to her); In re
J.A.G., 617 S.E.2d 325, 332 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that trial court erred in denying fit parent
physical custody but still retained authority to proceed with case); In re N.H., 373 A.2d 851, 856 (Vt.
1977) (permitting court to adjudicate child as neglected based on findings against one parent but
mandating that child be placed with other parent absent evidence of unfitness); State v. Gregory (In re
Gregory R.S.), 643 N.W.2d 890, 901 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that "children can be adjudicated to
be in need of protection or services even when only one parent has neglected the children").
132. Cases from other jurisdictions are also instructive. See, e.g., Meryl R. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ.
Sec., 992 P.2d 616, 618 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that juvenile court correctly dismissed
dependency case because child had noncustodial father who was ready and willing to parent him); In
re Welfare of T.L.L., 453 N.W.2d 355, 357 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that child is not dependent if
nonoffending, custodial parent is adequately meeting child's needs).
133. 855 So. 2d 175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
134. J.P., 855 So. 2d at 175.
135. Id. at 176.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.521(3)(b)(2) (West 2008 & Supp. 2009).
139. See B.C. v. Dep't of Children and Families, 864 So. 2d 486, 490 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
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California courts approach child welfare cases in the same way. California
law mandates that courts must place a child with the nonoffending parent
"unless it finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the
safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child." 140 Even after
the transfer of physical custody, the court may subject that parent to the
"supervision of the juvenile court" and may order that the parent comply with
services it deems necessary. 141 For example, in Mendocino County Department of
Social Services v. Shawn P. (In re Jeffrey P.), 142 the trial court ordered the child
to be placed with his nonoffending father after the mother's unsuitability was
proven, but then ordered the father to attend parenting classes and to accept the
services of a parent aide.143
The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision to compel the
nonoffending father to comply with services.'" It explained that the trial court
decided to give the father physical custody of the child while giving the state
agency legal custody, a decision that was "within the juvenile court's
discretion."1 45 In reaching this conclusion, it emphasized that a child protection
case was brought "on behalf of the child, not to punish the parents" and any
imposition placed on the parent only occurred to further the child's interests.1 46
Thus, interfering with a fit parent's legal custody was permissible so long as the
interference furthered the court's determination of the child's best interest.
Even in these jurisdictions where courts appear cognizant that parents
possess a constitutional right to custody of their child, courts have created an
artificial distinction between physical and legal custody, one that has never been
recognized by the Supreme Court. These courts interpret the Constitution to
only protect the physical custodial rights of fit parents, while permitting the state
to intrude upon that parent's legal rights to make decisions for the child. Never
has the Supreme Court recognized this distinction, and in fact, the decisions
discussed in Part III reflect the Court's strong protection of both physical and
legal custodial rights of fit parents. For example, in Stanley, the Court prevented
the state from removing children from the physical custody of their father absent
proof of unfitness. 147 In Troxel v. Granville,148 the Court barred courts from
second-guessing the decisions made by a presumptively fit parent regarding with
whom her child should associate.149 But despite these and other holdings, in
many states, once one parent is found to be unfit, the nonoffending parent is
(finding that, despite having superior right to custody of child, nonoffending parent could be ordered
to comply with case plan).
140. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.2(a) (West 2008).
141. Id. § 361.2(b)(3).
142. 267 Cal. Rptr. 764 (Ct. App. 1990).
143. In re Jeffrey P., 267 Cal. Rptr. at 766.
144. Id. at 766, 768-69.
145. Id. at 768.
146. Id.
147. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).
148. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
149. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 78-79.
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viewed with suspicion and his ability to make sound decisions for the child is
afforded no deference. Guilt by association pervades the process. "[A] finding
against one parent is a finding against both in terms of the child being adjudged a
dependent."150
C.

No State Involvement

Two states, Maryland and Pennsylvania, have recognized that nonoffending
parents have constitutionally protected rights and have adopted an approach
completely at odds with those described above. 15 There, if a nonoffending
parent exists, the court may not assume jurisdiction over the child for any
purpose, even to offer services to the offending parent or the child.152 The
juvenile court must dismiss the case and the only limited action it may take is to
grant custody to the nonoffending parent before dismissal.' 53 Once the transfer
of custody is made, all court involvement or oversight must be terminated.154
Two cases illustrate this approach. In In re M.L.,s 55 a trial court found that a
child was dependent because her mother was making repeated, false accusations
that the child was being sexually abused by her father, subjecting the child to
intrusive medical examinations. 156 While assuming jurisdiction of the child, the
court found the father to be a fit parent and immediately placed the child in his
care under the court's supervision.'57 The father appealed, arguing that the court
had no basis to maintain any oversight over the case since he was a fit parent.158
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with the father and reversed the
trial court's decision to exercise jurisdiction over the child because the child had
a fit, nonoffending parent. 159 The court determined that "a child, whose noncustodial parent is ready, willing and able to provide adequate care to the child,
cannot be found dependent."1 60 If the noncustodial parent is immediately
available to care for the child, then the court must grant that parent custody and
dismiss the case. 161 The court concluded that any retention of power by the trial
court to make decisions regarding the child would be "an unwarranted intrusion

150. L.A. County Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. John D. (In re James C.), 128 Cal. Rptr.
2d 270,278 (Ct. App. 2002) (quoting In re Nicholas B., 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 465, 472 (Ct. App. 2001)).
151. E.g., In re Sophie S., 891 A.2d 1125, 1133 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006); In re S.J.-L., 828 A.2d
352, 356 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
152. See In re Sophie S., 891 A.2d at 1133 (noting court previously held that where one parent is
"able and willing" to care for child, court may not adjudge child to be in need of assistance).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. 757 A.2d 849 (Pa. 2000).
156. In re M.L., 757 A.2d at 850.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 851.
160. Id. at 849.
161. In re M.L., 757 A.2d at 851.
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into the family," which is only appropriate "where a child is truly lacking a
parent."1 62
Maryland's Court of Special Appeals, in In re Russell G., 163 reached a
similar conclusion. There, court intervention was requested to protect the child
from his alcoholic mother; the child was committed to the Department of Social
Services for placement in the care and custody of his father.1' After the court
determined that the allegations against the mother were true, the court declared
that the child was dependent and placed him in the physical custody of his father,
but subjected that placement to the supervision of the Department of Social
Services, a decision which both parents appealed. 165
The Court of Special Appeals agreed that the court intervention was
inappropriate due to the willingness of the nonoffending parent to assume
immediate custody of the child. 166 "A child who has at least one parent willing
and able to provide the child with proper care and attention should not be taken
from both parents and be made a ward of the court." 167 Thus, the court
determined that a finding that a child was dependent was erroneous since a
nonoffending parent was willing to care for the child. 168 Subsequent to the
court's decision, the Maryland State Legislature amended its statute to permit
the juvenile court, before dismissing the child protective case, to award the
nonoffending parent custody after finding evidence that the child was harmed by
the other parent. 169 In Maryland and Pennsylvania, other than making this
custody determination, juvenile courts are prohibited from taking any actions
regarding the child where a nonoffending parent asserts his right to custody over
the child.170
V.

SHORTCOMINGS OF CURRENT APPROACHES

The three approaches described above fail to offer the correct balance
between safeguarding the constitutional rights of the nonoffending parent while
providing courts with the much-needed flexibility to address the needs of the
child and the other parent. The jurisdictions which permit trial courts to deprive
nonoffending parents of legal and/or physical custodial rights to their children
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
672 A.2d 109 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).
In re Russell G., 672 A.2d at 111.
Id.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 116.

169. See MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC.

§ 3-819(e)

(LexisNexis 2006 & Supp.2008) ("If the

allegations in the petition are sustained against only one parent of a child, and there is another parent
available who is able and willing to care for the child, the court may not find that the child is a child in
need of assistance, but, before dismissing the case, the court may award custody to the other parent.").
170. See In re Sophie S., 891 A.2d 1125, 1133 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) (stating that court could
not make adjudication as to whether child was in need of assistance where nonoffending parent was
able and willing to care for child); In re M.L., 757 A.2d 849, 851 (Pa. 2000) (holding that court lacks
authority to remove child where noncustodial parent is available and willing to care for child).
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run afoul of constitutional guarantees that prevent the state from encroaching on
these rights without a finding of parental unfitness. 1 These systems are ripe for
constitutional challenges.
In addition to their constitutional flaws, the policy of interference with the
custodial rights of fit parents is likely to produce bad outcomes for several
reasons. First, the stress that foster care systems across the country face is well
known, and all efforts to safely reduce the numbers of children in care will only
promote their best interests. 172 Yet, in states like Michigan and Ohio, children
are unnecessarily placed in overburdened foster care systems despite the
willingness and availability of fit parents to care for their children immediately.
In these states, courts are permitted to ignore the nonoffending parent and place
children in foster care even if that parent is fit. Restoring constitutional rights to
nonoffending parents will force courts to seriously consider those parents as
placement options unless clear evidence of unfitness exists, thereby reducing the
number of children completely dependent on the state. As aptly described by the
Washington State Court of Appeals, "A parent cannot be denied his right to
parent his child on the off-chance that he may have a problem unknown to the
State."l 73 This is precisely the approach endorsed by these states.
171. See supra Part III for a discussion of the constitutional requirement that the state prove
parental unfitness prior to depriving a parent of legal and physical custody of a child.
172. The foster care system should be seen as a place of last resort for children. Over half a
million children remain in the system, and each year more children enter foster care than exit it.
CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS REPORT:
PRELIMINARY FY 2006 ESTIMATES AS OF JANUARY 2008, at 1, 3-4 (2008), available at

http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats-research/afcars/tar/reportl4.pdf.
Social
workers
and
attorneys handling these cases are overwhelmed. See THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., THE UNSOLVED
CHALLENGE

OF SYSTEM

REFORM: THE CONDITION OF THE FRONTLINE HUMAN

SERVICES

WORKFORCE 9 tbl.1 (2003) (observing that annual turnover rate in child welfare workforce is twenty
percent for public agencies and forty percent for private agencies); Editorial, A Legal Hand for Foster
Children, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 28, 2005, at B8 ("[W]ith many of these lawyers burdened with
overwhelming student loans, poorly compensated posts and outrageous caseloads, many are being
forced out of these roles that foster children so desperately need."). Child abuse investigations are not
completed in a timely fashion, social workers and attorneys do not visit children in their placements,
and court hearings do not take place in accordance with federal guidelines. See Ben Kerman, What is
. . . the Child and Family Services Review?, VOICE, Fall 2003, at 35, 35-36, available at
http://www.caseyfamilyservices.org/pdfs/casey-whatis.pdf (explaining that majority of states reviewed
were not in "substantial conformity" with number of outcomes factors, including protecting children
from abuse and neglect and providing them with stable living conditions). On numerous occasions,
child welfare agencies have lost track of children in their custody or have failed to monitor a child's
placement, resulting in serious harm to the child. E.g., Michigan Agency Loses 302 Children,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 30, 2002. Not surprisingly, children in foster care experience a wide range of
problems, including mental health issues, poor academic performance, and involvement with the
juvenile delinquency system. See, e.g., CHILDREN's DEFENSE FUND, SUMMARY: IMPROVING
EDUCATION FOR HOMELESS AND FOSTER CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES IN THE INDIVIDUALS WITH

DISABILITIES EDUCATION IMPROVEMENT Acr OF 2004 (IDEA 2004) (P.L. 108-446), at 1 (2005),

http://www.childrensdefense.org/child-research-data-publications/datasummary-improving-educationhomeless-foster-children-disabilities-idea.pdf (observing that children in care are twice as likely to
drop out of school and almost forty percent of children who age out of care will never receive a high
school diploma).
173. State v. Gallardo-Cruz (In re S.G.), 166 P.3d 802,806 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
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Second, scarce public funds are wasted by ordering nonoffending parents to
comply with services which may or may not be necessary. 174 In most states,
nonoffending parents are presumed to be unfit upon a finding against the other
parent and are often put through a standard regimen of court-ordered services,
typically including parenting classes and psychological evaluations, to test their
fitness.175 Since evidentiary hearings detailing that parent's deficiencies are not
legally required, these services are mandated without any evidence of the
problem they are trying to solve or the connection between the problem and the
underlying abuse or neglect of the child. 176 A system which requires the state to
introduce reliable evidence of parental unfitness prior to intruding upon a
parent's custodial rights would ensure that the state's response is narrowly
tailored to the specific problems facing that parent.
Third, the approach hurts children by disempowering their parents and
increasing the likelihood that their parents will disengage from the process.
Research reveals that parents who are provided with procedural protections and
are given "their day in court" are much more likely to stay involved in the
process and comply with court mandates. Repeated studies by social
psychologists provide compelling evidence that a key determinant in retaining
the support of those involved in court systems is the utilization of fair procedures
to make decisions.177 Trust in the motives of authorities and judgments about the

174. Each year, states disburse more $10 billion in federal and state funds to pay for housing and
support services for children in foster care. Rob Geen et al., Medicaid Spending on Foster Children, in
2 CHILD WELFARE RESEARCH PROGRAM 1 (The Urban Inst., 2005); see also CYNTHIA ANDREWS
SCARCELLA ET AL., THE URBAN INST., THE COST OF PROTECTING VULNERABLE CHILDREN V:
UNDERSTANDING STATE VARIATION IN CHILD WELFARE FINANCING 6 (2006), available at

http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311314_vulnerable-children.pdf (reporting that, in 2004, states
spent over $23 billion on child welfare programs). States spend an additional $1.8 billion on
administering the child welfare system. Id. at 11 tbl.2. The costs of placements vary from state to state
and by type of placement. For example, it costs New York City roughly twenty-eight dollars a day to
keep a child in foster care. Leslie Kaufman, Bill to Save Foster Care Costs Is Stalled in the Legislature,
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2004, at B2. A North Carolina study revealed the following daily costs for
children's foster care placements: $12.01 (family foster care), $66.30 (specialized foster care), $129.93
(large group home), $132.86 (small group home), and $148.17 (emergency and other placements).
Richard P. Barth et al., A Comparison of the Governmental Costs of Long-Term Foster Care and
Adoption, 80 Soc. SERv. REV. 127, 136 tbl.1 (2006). After a child is placed with a nonoffending parent,
many of these costs would disappear.
175. See, e.g., B.C. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 864 So. 2d 486,490 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
(finding that court could order nonoffending parent to comply with case plan).
176. The Washington State Court of Appeals emphasized this point in reversing a termination of
parental rights decision in In re S.G., 166 P.3d 802, 803 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). In that case, the state
required the father to participate in services to address deficiencies without first proving the existence
of those deficiencies. Id. at 805-06. The court held that "the more basic problem is that it is impossible
to evaluate the sufficiency or efficacy of services as to [the father] when, at this point, the State failed
to show he required any. Without a problem, there can be no solution." Id. at 806.
177. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE

71 (1988) (stating that individuals' perception of fairness strongly informs their satisfaction and
general affect towards encounters with procedural justice); TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN
THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 51, 93 (2002)
(discussing procedural justice models and stating that cooperative overtures by authorities and courts
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fairness of procedures are strong influences on acceptance and satisfaction of
court mandates.178
In assessing what is "fair," litigants look to a number of factors. Most
importantly, procedures that permit individuals to present arguments and to
exert control over the process are deemed just whereas those that silence
litigants only exacerbate feelings of mistrust. 179 Central to these findings is a
person's need to have his story told, regardless of whether the telling will
ultimately impact the outcome of the case. 180 Fairness is also enhanced by
adequate representation and confidence that the decision maker is neutral and
unbiased.181 Courts that reaffirm one's self-respect and treat a person politely
while respecting one's rights earn the trust of those before it, regardless of the
substance of the orders they issue. 182
Yet, the crux of the approaches adopted in these jurisdictions does exactly
the opposite. Nonoffending parents are stripped of presumptions that their
children shall be placed in their legal and physical custody and are explicitly
denied the right to an evidentiary hearing at which the state must prove parental
unfitness. Instead, their unfitness is presumed, services the court believes are
necessary are ordered, and the parent has no choice but to simply submit to the
court's orders or walk away. 183 These approaches are devoid of any procedural
justice, which only exacerbates the likelihood that the parent will become
frustrated with the process and perhaps disengage in some way. This disillusion
can be avoided by restoring procedural rights to nonoffending parents and
requiring constitutionally mandated burdens of proof on the state. Parental
engagement will only enhance the quality of child protective proceedings.
Finally, allowing the court to interfere with the custodial rights of both
parents based on findings against one raises the possibility of manipulation. A
parent, in the context of an acrimonious divorce or custody battle, could make
allegations that lead to the filing of a petition. Once the petition is filed, that

lead to reciprocal cooperative behavior by individuals); ToM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW

115, 129, 137 (1990) (stating that perceived fairness by individuals of justice system is influenced by
factors such as efforts to grant greater process control and consideration of their views). See generally
Tom R. Tyler, What Is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairnessof Legal
Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 103 (1988) (analyzing interactions between citizens and legal
authorities from procedural justice perspective to determine factors influencing procedural fairness).
178. See TYLER & HuO, supra note 177, at 90 (noting that courts can increase compliance by
enacting procedures that are "fair and appropriate").
179. Cf Kees van den Bos et al., When Do We Need ProceduralFairness? The Role of Trust in
Authority, 75 J. OF PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1449, 1455 (1998) (discussing study of individuals'
reactions to authority in which individuals given opportunities to voice their opinions reported higher
satisfaction levels than those who were not); Gary B. Melton & E. Allan Lind, ProceduralJustice in
Family Court: Does the Adversary Model Make Sense?, in LEGAL REFORMS AFFECTING CHILD &
YOUTH SERVICES 65, 66 (Gary B. Melton ed., 1982) (discussing push for less adversarial procedures in
child custody cases to avoid institutionalizing and exacerbating tensions among family members).
180. TYLER, supra note 177, at 116, 127.
181. Id. at 137; van den Bos et al., supranote 179, at 1452; Tyler, supra note 177, at 105, 107.
182. TYLER, supra note 177, at 138; Tyler, supra note 177, at 129.
183. See supra Parts IV.A-B for a discussion of this point.
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parent could then admit to findings in the petition, which, in these states, would
then allow the court to enter broad orders that encroach upon the physical
and/or legal custody rights of both parents. Similarly, the child welfare agency
could pursue allegations against one parent for the sole purpose of obtaining
authority over the other parent, against whom allegations may be more difficult
to prove.1 " As noted by the Colorado Court of Appeals, "To allow an
adjudication under such circumstances would permit dependency and neglect
proceedings to be used for manipulative purposes .

.

. to the possible detriment

of the best interests of the child.""ss These are but some of the reasons why
ignoring the parental presumption of fitness, as it relates to nonoffending
parents, will generate poor outcomes for children.
On the other hand, the approach implemented in Maryland and
Pennsylvania, while zealously protecting the constitutional rights of
nonoffending parents, deprives juvenile courts of the flexibility to craft orders to
further the interests of the offending parent and the child. 186 In these states, the
juvenile court cannot maintain any oversight over the family; if a nonoffending
parent is able to care for the child, the case must be dismissed.187 The only
remedy available to the court is to grant the nonoffending parent custody of the
child prior to dismissal.188 This type of approach raises several concerns.
First, in many states, specialized services for children are only available to
children with open dependency cases. 189 This unfortunate reality exists, in part,
due to state budgetary constraints and policy choices and federal child welfare
statutes that provide states with funds to offer services to children involved in the
foster care system. 190 Thus, often, children not affiliated with the system are
deprived of needed services. 191

184. See In re Irwin, No. 229012, 2001 Mich. App. LEXIS 2088, at *12 (Mich. Ct. App. July 13,
2001) (Whitbeck, J., concurring) (observing that child welfare agency "could make a calculated guess
concerning which parent was less likely to demand a jury trial [and] proceed only against that parent,
... simply in order to preclude one parent from demanding a jury trial").
185. People ex rel. U.S., 121 P.3d 326, 328 (Colo. App. 2005).
186. See supra Part IV.C for a discussion of the hands-off approach of Maryland and
Pennsylvania courts.
187. See, e.g., In re Sophie S., 891 A.2d 1125. 1133 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) (holding juvenile
court will not adjudicate assistance petition when one parent is "able and willing to provide care"); In
re S.J.-L., 828 A.2d 352, 356 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (affirming termination of abused child's dependency
status proceedings where noncustodial parent was "ready, willing, and able" to care for child).
188. In re Sophie S., 891 A.2d at 1133 (citing MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-819(e)); In
re S.J.-L., 828 A.2d at 355.
189. Statement by Lex Frieden, Chairperson, Nat'l Council on Disability, Statement to the U.S.
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs: Castaway Children: Must Parents Relinquish Custody in
Order to Secure Mental Health Services for Their Children? (June 10, 2003).
190. Id.
191. See id. (observing that "[i]nadequate funding of mental health services and supports for
children and their families is the major reason families turn to the child welfare system for help"). In
his statement, Frieden cites to several studies supporting his statement, including one by the
Commonwealth Institute for Child and Family Studies which found that, in sixty-two percent of states,
the child welfare agency used a custody transfer to gain access to state funding for services for children
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Take, for example, a child who was sexually abused by her father and
placed immediately with her nonoffending mother. The mother wishes to enroll
the child in sex abuse counseling, which if privately retained would be quite
costly, but would be paid for by the state if an open dependency case existed.
The mother wishes for the case to remain open until the child receives all
necessary services, yet the approach adopted by Maryland and Pennsylvania
does not permit such a result; the willingness of the nonoffending parent to care
for the child mandates the dismissal of the case. The dearth of services outside
the child welfare system would likely result in the child's needs going unmet.
Second, this approach deprives offending parents of their statutory right to
receive an opportunity to reunify with their children and instead forces judges to
make premature decisions contrary to the child's interests. Federal law requires
states to make "reasonable efforts" to reunify the family if a child has been
removed from the home. 19 In Maryland and Pennsylvania, however, no
opportunity for reunification is given.193 After a child is placed with a
nonoffending parent, the court only has two options. It may simply dismiss the
case immediately, or it may grant the nonoffending parent custody of the child
and then dismiss the case. No other choices exist.
Closing the case without granting the nonoffending parent permanent
custody of the child may jeopardize the safety of the child and the nonoffending
parent. Once the judge dismisses the case, all of the orders entered in the child
protective case would lose their force and nothing would exist to protect the new
family unit from the abusive parent.194 The nonoffending parent would have no
legal authority to prevent the other parent from having access to the child, yet in
serious cases of child maltreatment, limiting access may be essential. The
nonoffending parent's recourse would be to file a separate custody action to
obtain such an order, but the time it may take to do so would be prohibitive. 195
with serious emotional and behavioral problems. Id. at n.16. Thirty-eight percent of the responding
child welfare agencies used custody transfers to obtain funding for children's treatment. Id.
192. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2006). State courts have interpreted this requirement to impose
an obligation on states to reunify children with the parent from whose care they were removed. See,
e.g., State v. Daniel M. (In re Ethan M.), 723 N.W.2d 363, 370-71 (Neb. Ct. App. 2006) (finding state
had to make efforts to reunify child with custodial parent). But see L.A. County Dep't of Children &
Family Servs. v. Patricia 0. (In re Patricia T.), 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 904, 908-09 (Ct. App. 2001) (affirming
trial court's decision denying offending parent reunification services when child was placed with
nonoffending parent); R.W. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 909 So. 2d 402, 403 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2005) (holding that substantial compliance with services did not mandate reunification with offending
parent when child was placed with nonoffending parent); In re T.S., 74 P.3d 1009, 1018 (Kan. 2003)
(finding that reasonable efforts requirement could be satisfied by reunifying child with noncustodial
parent).
193. In re Sophie S., 891 A.2d at 1133 (citing MD. CODE ANN., CrS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-819(e)); In
re S.J.-L., 828 A.2d at 356.
194. See In re N.H., 373 A.2d 851, 855 (Vt. 1977) ("In lieu of such a finding and the concomitant
lack of jurisdiction, there is a strong possibility that the child will be returned to the same situation
from which it has been taken.").
195. This problem would be exacerbated by the fact that many family courts remain fragmented
and, often, numerous judges hear cases involving the same litigants. See Judith D. Moran, Fragmented
Courts and Child Protection Cases: A Modest Proposalfor Reform, 40 FAM. CT. REv. 488, 488 (2002)
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In the interim, the child and the nonoffending parent would be subject to a state
of impermanence during which the abusive parent would continue to have equal
rights to access the child.
Maryland and Pennsylvania have responded to this safety risk by giving
courts the authority to grant the nonoffending parent permanent custody of the
child prior to closing the child protective case.196 But this too raises concerns
because a child's interests may not be served by granting the nonoffending
parent immediate custody prior to giving the other parent an opportunity to
reunify with her child after participating in services. 197 Consider the example of
the child who has been living with her mother for the past ten years, while
visiting her father every other weekend. The child enters the foster care system
after her mom lapsed into depression and hit her with a belt while intoxicated.
The evidence reveals that this only happened once, and the mother is eager to
participate in services. The child also wants to return to her mother's care but is
placed temporarily with her nonoffending father, who played no role in the
abuse.
Again, in Maryland or Pennsylvania, the juvenile court would have to close
the case either immediately upon placing the child with her father or after
granting the father long-term custody of the child. 198 But neither of these options
seems appropriate. Closing the case immediately may place the child in danger
for the reasons described above. Without receiving services, the mother may not
be in a position to safely care for the child, but no legal orders would prevent her
from having unlimited contact with her daughter or immediately resuming her
care for the child.

(noting that family law matters span multiple categories and jurisdictions, sometimes proceeding in
both criminal and civil arenas). Moran writes, "The ills created and perpetuated by this patchwork
court system addressing family matters wreak havoc on the fabric of family life," and often, "[f]amilies
lose precious time getting help because the system fails to facilitate connections to necessary services."
Id. at 489. Some jurisdictions have responded by creating unified family courts permitting judges to
hear all matters involving the same family. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1104(a) (LexisNexis 2008)
("To the greatest extent practicable, feasible, and lawful, if an individual who is a party to an action or
proceeding assigned to the Family Court has an immediate family or household member who is a party
to another action or proceeding assigned to the Family Court, the individual's action or proceeding
shall be assigned to the same judge or magistrate judge to whom the immediate family member's
action or proceeding is assigned."); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1023 (West Supp. 2008) ("When 2
or more matters within the jurisdiction of the family division of circuit court involving members of the
same family are pending in the same judicial circuit, those matters, whenever practicable, shall be
assigned to the judge to whom the first such case was assigned."). But, fragmented systems still
characterize many jurisdictions across the country. Moran, supra, at 488.
196. See MD. CODE ANN., Ors. & JUD. PROC. § 3-819(e) (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2008)
(permitting court to award permanent custody to nonoffending parent after petition is sustained as to
other parent); In re M.L., 757 A.2d 849, 851 n.3 (Pa. 2000) (allowing trial courts to use their equitable
powers to award nonoffending parent custody).
197. See Harris,supra note 15, at 306 (commenting that "the former custodial parent is not dead,
and she and the child continue to have claims to a relationship with each other and statutory rights to
state assistance to protect that relationship").
198. See supra Part IV.C for a discussion of how Maryland and Pennsylvania courts relinquish
jurisdiction after the child is no longer dependent on the court.
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Granting the father long-term custody may not be warranted either. The
mother, who has been the child's custodial parent for the past ten years and still
maintains residual rights to the child, is eager to regain custody of her child, is
willing to comply with services, and has a child who wants to return to her care.
She acknowledges that she made a mistake and desperately seeks to reunify with
the child, and placement with her, after she receives services, may be the best
outcome. Further, the child's father may not want to assume the role of the
permanent custodial parent. Forcing the court to issue a long-term custody order
based on one incident would deprive the mother of access to services to better
herself and would impose a high burden on her in the future to modify the
order.199 Instead, a much better approach, described below, would be to place
the child temporarily with the nonoffending parent, provide services to the
offending parent, and permit the court to make a long-term custody decision
after the mother has had the opportunity to participate in the services. This
option is not available in most jurisdictions.
As described above, the current approaches either fail to protect the rights
of the nonoffending parent or deprive courts of the much-needed flexibility to
meet the needs of the child and the offending parent. The adoption of a new
policy is required which balances all of these interests while surviving
constitutional scrutiny. The final Part describes such an approach.
VI. SOLUTION
My proposed solution consists of two guiding principles. First, a juvenile
court must be afforded the flexibility to assume jurisdiction over a child based on
findings of maltreatment against one parent. This authority is essential to
ensuring that the court has the ability to issue orders to remedy the abuse or
neglect by the offending parent. Second, in order to respect the constitutional
rights of the nonoffending parent, the court's power should be limited. While the
case is ongoing, absent proof of parental unfitness, the court must grant custodial
rights to the nonoffending parent to the satisfaction of that parent. The only
authority the court could exert over the nonoffending parent would be to compel
him to cooperate with reunification efforts, since the offending parent maintains
residual rights to the child. 200

199. A parent seeking to modify a custody order must prove that there has been a substantial and
material change of circumstance and that the modification is in the child's best interests, a high burden
as described by state courts. See, e.g., San Marco v. San Marco, 961 So. 2d 967, 970 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2007) (holding modifications must be in best interests of child and requiring materially altered
conditions of substantial degree for approval of modification (citing Wade v. Hirschman, 903 So. 2d
928, 932-33 (Fla. 2005))); Levin v. Levin, 836 P.2d 529, 532 (Idaho 1992) ("The party seeking
modification clearly has the burden of justifying a change in custody,... and although the threshold
question is whether a permanent and substantial change in the circumstances has occurred, the
paramount concern is the best interest of the child."); Baxendale v. Raich, 878 N.E.2d 1252, 1255 (Ind.
2008) ("Modifications are permitted only if the modification is in the best interests of the child and
there has been 'a substantial change'.").
200. The Supreme Court has recognized that parents do not lose their constitutionally protected
interest in their children because they have lost temporary custody of them. Santosky v. Kramer, 455
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This solution would be straightforward to implement in practice. Upon
finding that one parent abused or neglected the child, the court could obtain
jurisdiction over the child and could use that power to issue orders to remediate
the underlying abuse or neglect by the offending parent. This authority could be
used to regulate the offending parent's contact with the child, compel her
compliance with a case service plan, or even terminate her parental rights in
extreme circumstances. Additionally, the court could also order the child welfare
agency to provide services to the child and the nonoffending parent necessary to
address the maltreatment.
Despite having broad authority over the offending parent, the court's
jurisdiction over the nonoffending parent would be limited. As the case
proceeded, absent an unfitness finding, the court would have to grant the
nonoffending parent custodial rights to that parent's satisfaction. Any attempt to
interfere with those rights, unrelated to reunification efforts, would require the
filing of a petition against the nonoffending parent, which would then trigger all
the procedural protections available under state law. Only after making a
specific finding of unfitness against that parent could the court obtain authority
over him. Such a finding would trigger the court's ability to remove the child
from that parent's custody, 201 order the parent to participate in services, or
override his determination of what is best for the child.
As noted above, one exception would apply. Since child protective cases
implicate the constitutional rights of both parents, the court would have the
authority, even without an unfitness finding, to issue orders to ensure that the
nonoffending parent did not undermine the offending parent's ability to reunify
with her child. For example, the court could mandate that the nonoffending
parent make the child available for visitations with the other parent, institute
family therapy, and order that the child be returned to the temporary custody of
the offending parent. If the nonoffending parent refused to cooperate with
reunification efforts, the court could use its contempt powers to enforce orders.
Under this approach, preserving the custodial rights of the nonoffending
parent would not interfere with the opportunity of the other parent to reunify
with her child. After giving the offending parent the chance to participate in
services, the court would be well-positioned to make an informed decision about
which parent should be the long-term custodian of the child. This approach,
permitting the court to address the needs of the child and giving the offending
parent the opportunity to reunify with her child, while prohibiting the court from
intruding upon the rights of the nonoffending parent, strikes the appropriate
balance between flexibility, safety, and adherence to the due process rights of all
parents. 202
U.S. 745, 753 (1982) ("Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in
preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life.").
201. The court, however, would not need to find the nonoffending parent unfit prior to returning
the child to the custody of the offending parent. Custody transfers from one parent to another can
occur after the court makes a finding that the transfer is in the best interests of the child. Kauten v.
Kauten, 261 A.2d 759, 760 (Md. 1970).
202. Few courts have adopted this type of approach. One example is seen in People ex rel. U.S.,
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Critics of my approach may argue that giving nonoffending parents
unfettered discretion with regards to children who have been found to be abused
or neglected would jeopardize their well-being. They may assert that the state's
interest in these children is heightened due to the maltreatment, and that state
social workers are the experts in determining what the child needs. Under this
view, social workers, and not the child's parents, should have the broad authority
to make decisions for the child.203
This argument, however, is unpersuasive. It is important to remember that
nonoffending parents, by definition, are those against whom no allegations of
unfitness are made. No reason exists to doubt their decision-making abilities and
thus the state has no justification to intrude. If such grounds exist, a petition
alleging misconduct can be filed, an evidentiary hearing can be convened, and
findings can be made against that parent which would then empower the court to
issue orders related to that parent. While this process unfolds, the court could
also issue emergency orders to protect the child, as it could with regards to any
offending parent. But, without specific evidence of unfitness, the state has no
interest in interfering with the nonoffending parent's custodial rights to the
child?
Additionally, given the states' poor track record in meeting the basic needs
of children in foster care 205-a record that includes federal court oversight of
numerous state child welfare systems due to rampant violations of the
where the county Department of Human Services filed a petition alleging that the child's environment
was harmful to his welfare. 121 P.3d 326, 326 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005). The father admitted portions of
the petition, but the mother requested a trial before a jury, which found in favor of the mother. Id. The
trial court entered a dispositional order in which it found that it had jurisdiction over the father, but
not the mother, and required the father to participate in a treatment plan. Id. at 327. The guardian ad
litem requested that the mother be required as well to comply with services but the court refused,
concluding that it had no jurisdiction to do so. Id. The guardian ad litem appealed. Id.
The Colorado Court of Appeals sided with the trial court and ruled that findings made against
one parent cannot form the basis for requiring the other parent to comply with the treatment plan.
People ex. rel. U.S., 121 P.3d at 32& The father's admissions gave the court limited jurisdiction as to
him but not as to the mother. Thus, the trial court's decision to force the father to participate in
services was appropriate as was its finding that it could not issue any orders affecting the mother's
custodial rights. Id. ("Nothing in the statute grants a court the power to impose a treatment plan on a
parent when the child has not been found to be dependent and neglected by that parent.").
203. One additional factor to consider is the high rate of turnover among caseworkers involved in
the child welfare system. "Ninety percent of state child welfare agencies report difficulty in recruiting
and retaining workers." Sandra Stukes Chipungu & Tricia B. Bent-Goodley, Meeting the Challenges of
Contemporary Foster Care, 14 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 75, 83 (2004). The annual turnover rate in the
child welfare workforce is twenty percent for public agencies and forty percent for private agencies.
THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, supra note 172, at 9 tbl.1. Thus, often, caseworkers do not get to
know children on their caseloads well.
204. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652-53 (1972) (observing that "the State registers no
gain towards its declared goals when it separates children from the custody of fit parents" and, in fact,
it "spites its own articulated goals when it needlessly separates [a child] from his family").
205. See supra note 181 for a description of some of the problems children face in foster care. For
a comprehensive discussion of these issues, see generally GLORIA HOCHMAN ET AL., THE PEw
COMM'N ON CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE, FOSTER CARE: VOICES FROM THE INSIDE, available at

http://pewfostercare.org/research/voices/voices-complete.pdf.
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constitutional rights of foster children 206-the argument that the state is the
expert on addressing the needs of at-risk children is tenuous. Indeed, as the
Supreme Court has observed, "[H]istorically [the law] has recognized that
natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their
children." 207 No reason exists to deviate from this fundamental principle.
VII. CONCLUSION

Over the past hundred years, a consensus has developed recognizing a
parent's ability to raise his or her child as a fundamental, sacrosanct right
protected by the Constitution. Federal courts have repeatedly rejected the
parens patriae mode of decision making and have instead held that the
Constitution requires the state to introduce proof of parental unfitness prior to
the temporary or permanent deprivation of that right from a parent. Yet,
juvenile courts have persisted to strip nonoffending parents of those rights
without any procedural protections, a striking remnant of the parens patriae
mindset. Such actions not only raise many constitutional questions, but also
jeopardize the child's safety and well-being by increasing the likelihood that he
will unnecessarily enter foster care and that his parents will disengage with the
process.
Current approaches to rectify the problem fail to reflect the correct balance
between safeguarding the constitutional rights of the nonoffending parent and
preserving the flexibility of juvenile court judges to issue orders regarding the
offending parent and ensuring that appropriate services are available to the
child. This balance can be achieved by implementing a policy which permits the
court, upon a finding of abuse or neglect by one parent, to obtain limited
jurisdiction in the case to enter orders addressing that parent and to order the
child welfare agency to offer services to the child and the nonoffending parent.
But, without a finding of unfitness against the other parent, the court would be
prohibited from entering any orders that infringe upon the nonoffending
parent's custodial rights to the child, except to the extent necessary to further
reunification efforts. This compromise would ensure that fit parents remain the
prime decision makers in their child's life.

206. Children's Rights Inc., a nonprofit legal organization based in New York City, has litigated
numerous class action cases which have resulted in federal court oversight over state child welfare
systems. See Children's Rights, Legal Cases, http://www.childrensrights.org/reform-campaigns/legalcases/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2009) (listing ongoing and completed cases handled by Children's Rights
Inc.). This list only represents a partial summary of successful systemic actions brought against
dysfunctional child welfare systems. See, e.g., CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM. & ABA CTR. ON
CHILDREN AND THE LAW, CHILD WELFARE CONSENT DECREES: ANALYSIS OF THIRTY-FIVE COURT

ACTIONS FROM 1995 To 2005, at 2 (2005), available at http://www.cwla.orgladvocacy/
consentdecrees.pdf (finding that twenty-one states were either currently under court-approved
consent decree or court order, or had pending litigation brought against their child welfare agencies).
207. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979).
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